Ukrainian Refugees in Poland Delay Return Home

More than half of Ukrainian refugees living in Poland say they want to return home eventually, but for now most are waiting for the war to end, a sign that the country’s postwar labor force and housing market will still be shaped by a large diaspora that remains economically embedded abroad.
The survey, published by Rating Group, found 51% of respondents want to go back to Ukraine, yet only 8% are prepared to do so in the near term. Another 43% said they would return only after the war ends, underscoring how security — not wages alone — remains the decisive factor behind migration decisions. For Kyiv, that means the scale and speed of any return flow will hinge less on sentiment than on the durability of peace and the pace of reconstruction.
That matters economically because Ukrainian refugees have become an important part of Poland’s workforce. The poll found 73% of respondents are already employed, and 87% of those working do so in Poland. Most also appear settled into local life: 81% rent housing, 60% rate their Polish-language skills as medium or high, and 57% say they are satisfied with their social adaptation. Those figures suggest many households have built enough financial and social ties to make a rapid exodus unlikely, even among people who still say they ultimately want to leave.
The findings also point to a return problem that goes beyond the battlefield. While 71% cited safety and stability in Ukraine as a prerequisite for coming back, only 36% mentioned economic development and 26% pointed to job opportunities. That ranking implies that even after fighting stops, Ukraine may still struggle to pull back a large share of displaced people unless firms can hire, wages improve and public services recover. In other words, peace may be necessary but not sufficient.
For investors and policymakers, the survey highlights two competing narratives. The bullish case for Ukraine’s recovery is that a large pool of working-age migrants still sees the country as home, creating a potential labor and consumption rebound once security improves. The bear case is that extended war and slow reconstruction will encourage more permanent settlement abroad, especially in Poland and other EU states, draining Ukraine of talent while giving host economies a larger, more stable migrant workforce.
The split also has implications for Poland. If many refugees remain for years, their spending, rent demand and labor participation will continue to support parts of the Polish economy, even as political pressure over migration persists. But if the war ends and returns accelerate, employers in sectors that have relied on Ukrainian labor could face tighter hiring conditions.
The longer the conflict lasts, the more these temporary arrangements harden into durable migration patterns. For markets and governments alike, the key variable is no longer whether Ukrainians want to go home — many do — but whether the conditions emerge that make going home economically and personally viable.
| Entity | Gains | Losses |
|---|---|---|
| Ukraine | ▲Future labor return potential | ▼Current workforce depletion |
| Poland | ▲Migrant labor and rental demand | ▼Political pressure over migration |
| Ukrainian refugees in Poland | ▲Job access and stability | ▼Delayed return home |
| Employers in Poland | ▲Reliable labor supply | ▼Possible labor shortages if returns speed up |