Da Nang is trying to turn its 477 OCOP-certified products into export businesses, and the city’s answer is less about branding than about fixing the farm-to-factory chain that has kept most local specialties at home.
Da Nang OCOP Export Push Targets Supply Chain
Only 19 of those products have reached overseas markets, a gap that matters because it shows how quickly certification can outpace commercial readiness. The city said OCOP exports generated just over 50 billion dong in the first half of 2026, underscoring how far local producers still are from converting recognition into recurring foreign sales.
The central constraint is supply-chain quality. Da Nang says too few raw-material areas carry the traceability and planting-area codes required by international buyers, while many producers still lack the scale and processing depth to meet supermarket and e-commerce standards. That leaves small firms buying scattered inputs, raising costs and making consistency difficult — a major obstacle in export food categories where buyers demand uniformity, safety and reliable volumes.
The city’s strategy is built around three levers: standardizing raw-material zones, deepening processing and unlocking capital. By 2030, Da Nang aims to form 5,000 hectares of concentrated production areas, including 2,000 hectares with internationally recognized planting-area codes, and build five high-value supply chains linking cultivation with processing. It is also setting aside 3.7 trillion dong in medium-term public investment from 2026 to 2030 as seed money to crowd in private capital.
That matters economically because it shifts the OCOP model from a subsidy-and-label exercise toward an industrial value chain. Better raw-material standardization can lower rejection risk in export markets, improve margins through scale, and give local firms a chance to move beyond low-value souvenir sales into repeat orders from retailers, hotels and cross-border e-commerce platforms. It also supports rural incomes by tying farmers more tightly to formal buyers instead of volatile spot markets.
The cases of Spoon It and My Phuong Food show why the effort matters. Both brands spent years and money on failed product iterations before finding export demand. My Phuong’s coconut cookies, once rejected by early tasters for being too hard and too sweet, are now sold in 20 markets including Japan, South Korea, the US and Australia. Spoon It’s peanut butter, launched during the pandemic, only turned profitable after four years and now exports to South Korea.
Their experience highlights the investor case as well. Businesses with standardized inputs, better machinery and a credible digital sales channel are more likely to produce durable cash flow, while those relying on informal sourcing remain difficult to scale and finance. The lesson for investors is that the real upside in Da Nang’s OCOP program may not lie in the number of certified products, but in which firms can clear the costly transition from local specialty to export-grade manufacturer.
The city is also using distribution as a test bed. A Made in Da Nang promotion at Aeon Mall brought nearly 20 firms and cooperatives to 18 booths, giving them direct access to buyers from modern retail chains including Aeon, Mega Market and Lotte. That kind of exposure is important because access to shelf space, not just production, often determines whether a small food brand can graduate into a repeat export business.
For Da Nang, the narrative is now clear: OCOP can become an export engine only if technology, raw-material standardization and financing move together. The risk is that the city ends up with more certificates than market access; the upside is a more resilient provincial food-export base that can compete in both domestic modern retail and overseas supply chains.
| Entity | Gains | Losses |
|---|---|---|
| Da Nang OCOP producers | ▲Export access, higher margins | ▼Dependence on informal sourcing |
| Farmers in raw-material zones | ▲Stable offtake, better standards | ▼Short-term adjustment costs |
| Retailers and overseas buyers | ▲Traceable, standardized supply | ▼Smaller pool of compliant suppliers |
| Informal small-scale competitors | ▲— | ▼Pricing power, market share |

