Inner Mongolia yellowhorn project creates income

That matters because the Horqin effort is part of the broader Three-North Shelterbelt Forest Program, China’s decades-long bid to hold back desertification across the north. Beijing says it treated 152 million mu of desertified land from 2021 to 2025, underscoring the scale of the campaign and the government’s willingness to keep funding land restoration as a public good. In economic terms, that is about protecting farmland, infrastructure, water resources and rural livelihoods from sand encroachment, while also creating a base for longer-term rural industry.

For villagers, the gains are already visible. The project has organized five labor teams for seedling transport, watering, patrol and maintenance, generating more than 4,160 person-times of work and 1.57 million yuan in extra income. That gives local households immediate cash income even before the trees reach full production, which is important in a region where minority residents make up nearly 90% of the population and rural employment remains closely tied to state-led development projects.

Yellowhorn also offers a more commercial angle than many restoration species. Its seeds can be pressed for oil, leaves used for tea and branches used for medicinal purposes, making it a potential platform for value-added processing rather than just afforestation. Wang Liwei of the Inner Mongolia Academy of Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Sciences said most output is still sold as raw material, leaving room to build a deeper industrial chain. That suggests a second phase of upside: if processing, branding and downstream demand develop, the project could move from subsidy-supported planting to a small but durable rural business model.

For investors, the story is less about a single plantation than about the policy mix behind it. China’s desert-control projects can support demand for seedlings, irrigation equipment, land engineering, maintenance services and possibly renewable-power-linked land use, while also benefiting local contractors and agricultural research outfits. The flip side is execution risk: survival rates matter, and the economics are still dependent on continued public backing, making this a long-duration development play rather than a quick commercial return.

The broader narrative is that China is trying to turn environmental repair into an economic asset. In Horqin, the proof will come next spring, when the three-year partnership ends and the trees are handed over to the village. If the yellowhorn stand survives and downstream products emerge, the project could become a template for how desert-control spending generates both resilience and rural income.