Sénégal turned to a complex derivatives structure worth almost 1,000 billion CFA francs after losing access to cheaper funding, a move that likely helped keep the government financed but also exposed how strained public accounts pushed Dakar into riskier territory.
Senegal Uses Total Return Swaps to Fill Funding Gap

That is the real lesson from Alioune Diouf’s testimony before a parliamentary inquiry into the country’s Total Return Swaps, or TRS: the state was not chasing financial engineering for its own sake. It was trying to plug a funding gap after the IMF suspended its program following a misreporting scandal, other lenders froze about 600 billion CFA francs in expected disbursements and eurobond markets effectively shut with yields climbing to as high as 15%.
For investors, the episode matters because it reveals the price of sovereign stress. When market confidence breaks, governments do not simply pay more for money — they are often forced into structures that can be harder to understand, harder to unwind and more expensive in a crisis. That increases refinancing risk, complicates budget planning and can weigh on everything from local debt markets to bank balance sheets and foreign investor appetite.
Diouf said Senegal’s financing need reached 6,075 billion CFA francs, while the domestic market could only realistically absorb about 3,500 billion. That left a gap that authorities decided had to be filled one way or another. In his telling, TRS were the least bad option available because they kept the financing inside the local market rather than turning to eurobonds at punishing yields.
The government ultimately struck the swaps with First Abu Dhabi Bank, the African Finance Corporation and Société Générale. Diouf said the net exposure came to 720.8 billion CFA francs, plus 278 billion CFA francs in so-called Independent Amount collateral, bringing the total close to 1,000 billion.
He also argued that the structure limited one of the biggest dangers in such deals: margin calls. By using domestic public securities as collateral rather than land, minerals or other strategic assets, Senegal tried to ring-fence the risk. Diouf said the country has not faced a default or margin-call problem so far, even through a period of severe financial pressure.
That reassurance is important, but it does not erase the bigger story. Senegal’s resort to TRS shows how quickly sovereign funding can become precarious when external lenders step back and international markets demand a steep premium. It also shows why transparency around off-balance-sheet or derivative-linked borrowing matters to bondholders and to anyone assessing the durability of a government’s debt strategy.
For long-term investors, the takeaway is simple: a country that has to improvise its financing is a country whose credit story is still fragile. Senegal may have avoided a disorderly stop, as Diouf put it, but the need for such a workaround is itself a warning that fiscal repair, not just liquidity, remains the real challenge ahead. Worth watching, not rushing into.
| Entity | Gains | Losses |
|---|---|---|
| Senegal government | ▲Near-term funding | ▼Simplicity, flexibility |
| FAB, AFC, Société Générale | ▲Yield on structured deals | ▼Little, if defaults stay contained |
| Domestic bond market | ▲More issuance demand | ▼Crowded funding conditions |
| IMF and other lenders | ▲Incentive for tighter oversight | ▼Leverage over financing terms |



