Commercial real estate finance is getting hit where it hurts most: certainty of capital.
Higher Rates Squeeze CRE Dealmaking

When Coles dumped its planned $4 billion merger, it signaled that rising debt costs and tighter underwriting are no longer just pressuring marginal borrowers — they are blowing up strategic deals that only penciled out in a cheaper-money era. That matters because real estate is a leverage business, and when financing becomes unstable, mergers, acquisitions and refinancings all get harder to complete at the prices sellers want.

The macro backdrop is unforgiving. The 10-year Treasury yield is around 4.53%, the 2-year near 4.13% and high-yield credit spreads remain tight but not cheap at 273 basis points, which means debt is still expensive enough to punish ambitious transaction structures without triggering a full credit panic. In other words, capital is available, but not on the terms that supported the last real estate deal wave.
That is why this retreat matters well beyond one merger. Commercial property buyers have spent the past two years adjusting to a world where refinancing risk, not just occupancy, determines value. Every basis point in funding costs compounds through cap rates, leverage levels and exit assumptions. Deals that looked accretive when rates were near zero can become value-destructive once debt service swallows the spread.
Investors should read this as a warning and an opportunity. The market underestimates how much pain is still embedded in real estate balance sheets, especially among highly levered owners, development platforms and private equity-backed assets that need refinancing at higher coupons. But it also creates a clear winner’s list: brokers, servicing platforms, distressed-debt buyers and the best-capitalized landlords can gain market share when weaker competitors are forced to retreat.
The public market has already started to separate those names. CBRE and JLL have been resilient because they earn fees from transaction volume, leasing and capital markets activity, not from owning the assets that are getting repriced. Simon Property Group, meanwhile, looks better positioned than most property owners because its cash flows and access to capital give it optionality while smaller players scramble to refinance or sell.
This is the kind of inflection point investors often miss. The headline is about one merger, but the real story is that expensive debt is forcing a reset in commercial real estate strategy. If rates stay elevated and growth softens, the next wave of opportunity will not come from chasing the most levered landlords — it will come from owning the toll roads of the breakup, restructuring and refinancing cycle. I believe investors should position for that second-order effect now.
| Entity | Gains | Losses |
|---|---|---|
| CBRE, JLL | ▲Higher advisory fees | ▼Slower deal closings |
| SPG, top landlords | ▲Market share gains | ▼Higher refinancing costs |
| Distressed-debt buyers | ▲Cheaper assets, restructurings | ▼Slower recovery if rates stay high |
| Levered real estate bidders | ▲More caution from sellers | ▼Broken deals, repricing |




